Abstract. Mental models are internal representations of world structure, used to accomplish cognitive tasks. We postulate specific representations (of objects/images) and associated contexts (of world/view) for mental models of line drawings. We then analyze these representations and contexts to predict specific perceptual modes, including the relative strengths of these modes. The predicted modes are supported by a well-know example (from Rock 1983) where object perception changes with image orientation.
Introduction
Our percepts are remarkably modal . For example, Figure 1 is typically perceived as either a 90° angle that is slanted relative to the image plane, or a non-90° angle that is oriented parallel to the image plane. These modes are so vivid Bobick 1988, Richards et al. 1996) that people rarely consider the possibility that the image could depict a non-90° angle at an arbitrary slant, or even unconnected 3-D lines. The question is: What causes the dominant modes? Figure 1 . Two dominant modes of perception are: (i) a 90° angle slanted relative to the image plane, and (ii) a non-90° angle oriented parallel to the image plane.
Preferences and non-accidentals
An early answer to this question involves the Gestalt principles of proximity, continuity, similarity, and good form. Consistent with the principle of "good form", Attneave (1972) and Stevens (1983 Stevens ( , 1979 found that 2-D parallelograms (Figure 2 (a)) were perceived as slanted 3-D squares (1) . However, Attneave and Frost (1969) found that parallelepipeds (Figure 2(b) ) were perceived (with less good form) as having rectangular faces, and Perkins (1972) found that certain parallelepipeds (Figure 2(c) ) were perceived (with even less good form) as having nonrectangular faces. The other Gestalt principles (i.e., proximity, continuity and similarity) suffer similar limitations, and all of these principles awaited the development of more comprehensive explanations. A significant advance was the computational theory of "non-accidental" features (Lowe and Binford 1985, Lowe 1987) , and related theories based on the concept of a "generic" viewpoint (Binford 1981 , Albert and Hoffman 1995 , Freeman 1996 . These theories explain how "coincidental" 2-D features (e.g., parallelism) can be used to infer corresponding 3-D properties, based on imagegenerating regularities.
However, image-generating regularities do not explain why 2-D features that are not coincidental (i.e., non-90° 2-D angles, unequal 2-D lengths, and unequal 2-D angles) often have "preferred" 3-D interpretations (i.e., 90° 3-D angles, equal 3-D lengths, and equal 3-D angles). For example, Figure 3 is typically perceived as an isosceles pyramid with a square base, even though the image contains no corresponding features (e.g., equal or 90° angles) to support this percept. A preference for equal angles was noted by Marill (1991) and further explored by Leclerc and Fischler (1992) , but these authors did not reconcile the preference for good form with the likelihood of non-accidental features (also see Chater 1996 , Rock 1983 , Hochberg and Brooks 1960 , Hochberg and McAlister 1953 , Leeuwenberg and Boselie 1988 , and Witkin and Tenenbaum 1983 . 
Bayesian inference
Recent researchers (see Knill and Richards 1996) have used a Bayesian framework to characterize (and unify) the role of preferences and non-accidentals in human perception. In this framework, preferences are represented by "prior" distributions, non-accidentals are represented by "likelihood" functions, and Bayes Rule provides the mathematical formalism for combining priors and likelihoods into "posterior" percepts.
Using Bayes Rule, the inference of a 3-D property (P) from a 2-D feature (f) can be expressed as:
where:
p(P|f) is the "posterior" distribution p(P) is the "prior" distribution p(f|P) is the "likelihood" function.
In Bayesian terms, a perceptual "mode" ) is caused by a peak in the posterior, which in turn is caused by a peak in the prior, the likelihood, or both. The key question (addressed below) then becomes: What are the prior/likelihood peaks, and what are the underlying regularities that give rise to these peaks?
Mental models
Mental models are internal representations of world structure, used to accomplish cognitive tasks. Mental models have been hypothesized to explain human performance in a variety of tasks, such as understanding discourse (Johnson-Laird 1983) , reasoning about physical devices (Gentner and Stevens 1983 ) and controlling complex systems (Moray 1990 ). Here we explore the role of mental models in visual perception.
Previous research has been criticized (see Rouse and Morris 1986) for failing to distinguish mental models from knowledge in general. Here we contribute to the theory of mental models by characterizing specific knowledge representations (i.e., probability distributions, see Gigerenzer et al. 1991 ) in a specific domain (i.e., line drawings). Previous research has also debated whether mental models are stored knowledge structures (Doyle and Ford 1998) or situation-specific constructs (Wilson and Rutherford 1989) . Here we address both kinds of representations in explaining perceptual modes. That is, we use a Bayesian framework to show how situationspecific models (i.e., posteriors) can be constructed from stored knowledge models (i.e., priors and likelihoods).
Line drawings
The interpretation of line drawings has been an active subject in the field of machine vision (see Barrow and Tenenbaum 1981 , Biederman 1987 , Chakravarty 1979 , Clowes 1971 , Cooper 1993 , Cowie and Perrott 1993 , Draper 1980 , Guzman 1968 , Huffman 1971 , Kanade 1981 , Kanade and Kender 1983 , Lee et al. 1985 , Mackworth 1973 , Malik 1987 , Malik and Maydan 1989 , Sugihara 1982 , Ulupinar and Nevatia 1994 , 1993 , and Waltz 1975 . Much of this work has been concerned with identifying deterministic "constraints" on possible 3-D interpretations and then enumerating "all" interpretations that satisfy these constraints in a simplified domain. Here we are concerned with probabilistic "preferences" and "likelihoods" so we make no attempt to enumerate all possible percepts (even in a simplified domain). Rather, our goal is to explain how perceptual modes (of mental models) arise from natural modes (of world/view structure).
With this motivation, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 postulates a set of 2-D features and 3-D properties that are "represented" in mental models of line drawings. Section 3 identifies a set of world/view regularities that set the "context" for these representations. Section 4 uses a well-known example (from Rock 1983) to demonstrate how our Bayesian analysis of mental models can predict observed modes of human perception.
Representation (features and properties)
Perceivers cannot possibly represent all aspects of the world, so they should be selective in representing 2-D features and 3-D properties that are "informative". Consider the intuitive progression (Kandinsky 1979 ) from a 0-D point, to a 1-D collection of points (line), to a 2-D pair of lines (angle). In this progression, a feature at one level can be considered informative if it measures something that is not explicitly measured at a lower level. Thus, an informative (albeit incomplete) set of 2-D features is as follows: In theory, these features/properties are continuous-valued, but in practice they take on discrete values based on what viewers can "measure". For example, an angle (2-D feature or 3-D property) can take on any theoretical value between 0°-180° (2) , but physical limits of resolution set a lower bound on the width of each discrete-valued "bin" (3) . We assume that 2-D features are known from the image (subject to a limit of resolution), so each feature is represented by a discrete value. However, 3-D properties must be "inferred" from the image, so each property is represented by a discrete probability distribution (Figure 4 ). We propose that these probability distributions are the mental models (internal representations) that viewers use to make perceptual inferences (also see Gigerenzer et al. 1991 , Johnson-Laird 1994 . Our claim is not that people represent probability distributions in precise, quantitative terms. Rather, we claim that people must represent these distributions in at least rough, order-ofmagnitude terms (see Nakayama and Shimojo 1996, Hertwig et al. 1999 ) in order to make "reliable" inferences about 3-D properties from 2-D features.
Context (world and view)
To infer a 3-D property (P) from a 2-D feature (f), viewers must choose a "maximum likelihood" value (see Knill and Richards 1996) from the distribution p(P|f). The question is: How do viewers construct a representation of p(P|f)?
Using Bayes Rule, we can write:
where "W" and "v" set the context for the prior and likelihood, respectively. "W" refers to viewers' knowledge (assumptions) about object-generating causes in the world Richards 1993, Leyton 1992) , and "v" refers to viewers' knowledge (assumptions) about imagegenerating views of this world (4) . The remainder of this Section examines specific regularities of the world (W) and view (v) that can generate peaks and valleys in the prior and likelihood distributions. Some of these regularities have been proposed as "constraints" by previous authors, but we make a fundamental distinction between "modes" (which are characterized by peaks in probability distributions) and "constraints" (which are characterized by valleys or low magnitude flat regions in probability distributions). The latter are called "constraints" (in a more narrow sense than some authors use the term) because they act (when probability distributions are combined via Bayes Rule) to constrain modes (i.e., suppress peaks). 
90°°°° angle and zero slant
Consider the inference of 3-D angle magnitude Α from 2-D angle magnitude α, p(Α|α). The world contains object-generating forces (i.e., carpentry and gravity) that cause 90° angles to be generated at a frequency greater than chance. Since there are no obvious regularities that systematically generate other angles, we can estimate the "prior" distribution of 3-D angles p(Α) by computing a random distribution with a small percentage (5) of angles fixed at 90°. The result is a noisy-flat distribution with a sharp peak at Α=90° ( Figure 5 ). Now consider the "likelihood" function, p(α|Α). A 3-D angle Α can project to any 2-D angle α, depending on the tilt (τ n ) and slant (σ n ) of its normal vector (where "normal" is defined relative to the plane of the two angle-forming lines). Since there are no obvious regularities that systematically generate a specific view of Α, the possible views can be characterized as uniformly distributed (Witkin 1981) . In this context, the computed likelihood function (6) is peaked at α=Α as shown in the panels of Figure 6 . This corresponds to a 3-D configuration where the plane of the angle Α has zero surface slant, i.e., the normal to this plane is along the viewer's line of sight. Note that a similar result is computed for the likelihood (7) p(l|L) of line lengths, as shown in Figure 7 .
When Bayes Rule is used to combine this likelihood (peaked at α=Α, see Figure 6 ) with the prior (peaked at Α=90°, see Figure 5 ), the resulting posterior p(Α|α) is double peaked (except for the special case where α=90°). These two peaks (Α=90° and Α=α) explain the two modes of angle magnitude in which Figure 1 is perceived.
The strengths of these two modes can be estimated by defining the following qualitative (orderof-magnitude) probabilities: 0 < ε < ρ < 1 (see Richards et al. 1996 , Hertwig et al. 1999 . The "peaks" of the prior p(Α) and likelihood p(α|Α) are characterized as having probability of order ρ, and the "flats" of these distributions are characterized as having probability of order ε. The resulting posterior then has peaks of magnitude ρε: 
Coincident, coterminal, parallel
Consider two points separated by a 3-D distance "D" (in the world). Assuming orthographic projection (to an image), the projected 2-D distance "d" is given by D cos σ, where σ is the slant of the virtual line that connects the two points in 3-D space. Now consider the feature f coincident , which means that two points occupy the same position in the 2-D image (i.e., 0<d<δ, where δ is the lower limit of visual resolution). Using δ as a unit of measurement for distance (length), we can define a discrete set {D 1 = δ, D 2 = 2δ, …, D I = Iδ} of possible 3-D (world) distances that could project to a specific 2-D (image) distance "d". Assuming that the possible views (slants) are uniformly distributed, the computed probability (fraction of slants) that a specific 3-D distance D i will project to a 2-D distance "d" is shown in the panels of Figure 8 (7) . In order-of-magnitude terms, these "likelihood" results can be summarized as follows (8) :
If the "prior" distribution for 3-D distances {D 1 , D 2 , …, D I } were flat, i.e., p(D 1 ) = p(D 2 ) = p(D i ) = ε, then the likelihood peak at D=δ (see above) would combine with this flat prior to produce a posterior peak at D=δ. However, a prior regularity of the world is that an object-generating force acting at one location/time is also likely to act at a nearby location/time. Thus, the potential for a "common cause" (see Rock 1983 , also Section 3.4 here) supports a prior peak (estimated to be of order ρ) at D=δ. This prior peak is amplified by the likelihood peak (of order 1, see above) to produce an extremely strong posterior peak at D=δ. The strength of the posterior mode is estimated as follows:
Mode coincident: prior (ρ) * likelihood (1) → posterior (ρ)
Thus, given f coincident , the modal percept is P coincident . A similar argument applies to other "nonaccidental" features/properties of lines, i.e., f coterminal → P coterminal and f parallel → P parallel . Note that this posterior peak is much higher (by a factor of 1/ε) than the posterior peak for the modes Α=90° and Α=α (see above), so non-accidental features (e.g., f coincident , f coterminal , f parallel ) should produce extremely strong perceptual modes. This prediction is supported by Figure 1 , where the "non-accidental" 2-D coterminality of lines is vividly perceived as a 3-D coterminality of lines, regardless of the mode in which the angle magnitude is perceived (i.e., Α=90° or Α=α).
Non-90°°°° angle
Some regularities of the world/view "produce" perceptual modes (see above), while other regularities "suppress" (constrain) these modes. A simple example is that an angle can have only one value at a given time, hence perception in Α=90° mode will suppress perception in Α=α mode (and vice versa) for a given image angle α.
A more subtle case arises when three lines meet at a "Y" intersection (Figures 2(b) and 2(c)). As noted by Perkins (1972) and Stevens (1981) , the geometry of orthographic projection prevents certain arrangements of 2-D lines (Figure 2(c) ) from being projections of mutually perpendicular 3-D lines. In other words, when the 2-D angles α,β,γ violate Perkins' constraint (9) , then the likelihood p(Α=Β=Γ=90°|α,β,γ) is zero. With this constraint, the dominant mode Α=Β=Γ=90° must be relaxed to one of the following three modes: Α=Β=90°≠Γ, Α=Γ=90°≠Β, or Β=Γ=90°≠Α. Thus, viewers typically perceive one face of Figure 2 (c) to be non-rectangular (10) .
Equal angles/lengths
Another case of mutual constraint arises between the "angle" and "length" modes discussed above. Recall that the mode Α=90° corresponds to a peak in the prior p(Α), while the mode l=L corresponds to a peak in the likelihood p(l|L,v generic ). The constraint is that (for the general case where Α≠α) the 3-D angle Α can be 90° only if the 3-D length L is not equal to the 2-D length l (for at least one of the two lengths that comprise angle Α). Thus, perception in mode Α=90° will suppress the mode l=L (of the likelihood function for length), and the perceived 3-D lengths (for lines of a perceived 90° angle Α) will depend on the prior p(L).
The problem now is how to characterize the prior p(L). Unlike the case of 90° angles (generated by carpentry and gravity), there are no obvious regularities of the world that systematically generate lines of a specific 3-D length. However, a force that generates a 3-D length L B at one location/time in the world is more likely than chance to generate an equal length L C =L B at a nearby location/time. Thus, the potential for a "common cause" (see Rock 1983 ) suggests a prior peak for the property L B =L C . This mode (in conjunction with the mode for Α=90°) is supported by psychophysical data obtained by Stevens (1983 Stevens ( , 1979 and Attneave (1972) . These data show that crosses and parallelograms (Figure 2(a) ) are typically perceived as having 90° 3-D angles and equal 3-D lengths.
A similar argument supports a preference (mode) for perceiving equal angles when the angles are constrained to be non-90°. This prediction is supported by Figure 3 , which contains non-parallel lines and an "Arrow" intersection that violates Perkins' constraint. These features suppress the mode Α=90° for the top and side angles, and the figure is perceived as an isosceles pyramid (i.e., equal side lengths/angles). The base angle, which is then "unconstrained", is perceived in accordance with the modes Α=90° and L B =L C (i.e., a square base).
To estimate the strength of the equal angle (length) mode, note that the property Α B =Α C (or L B =L C ) involves two angles (lengths). Given a specific 3-D angle Α B and a uniform distribution of possible views, the likelihood (i.e., p(α b |Α B ,v generic )) of a specific 2-D image angle α b can be characterized as of order ε (except near α b = Α B , see Figure 6 ). The same result applies to any other specific 3-D angle Α C and its corresponding 2-D image angle α c . Assuming that the two angles/views are independent, the joint likelihood of two specific angles is given by p(α b |Α B ,v generic )* p(α c |Α C ,v generic ), which is of order ε 2 . Assuming a prior peak of order ρ for the "common cause" of equal angles/lengths (i.e., the same order of magnitude as the cause of 90° angles, see Section 3.1), the predicted strength of the posterior mode is as follows:
Mode equal angles/lengths:
Note that the strength of this mode ( ρε 2 ) is less than the strength (ρε) of the Α=90° mode (see Section 3.1 above). This may explain why some people perceive Figure 2 (a) as a slanted rectangle rather than a slanted square (i.e., 90° angles but not equal lengths). Additional support for the relative strengths of these two modes is provided by Figure 2(b) , which is perceived as having all 90° 3-D angles but not all equal 3-D lengths. In this case, the mode Α=Β=Γ=90° uniquely determines (constrains) the line slants σ A , σ B , σ C by the geometry of orthographic projection (see Attneave and Frost 1969) . These line slants, along with the 2-D line lengths (l a , l b , l c ), uniquely determine the 3-D lengths L A , L B , L C (via L = l / cos σ). Thus, in perception of Figure 2 (b), the "stronger" mode Α=Β=Γ=90° dominates the "weaker" mode L A =L B =L C .
Vertical/horizontal orientation
Another regularity of the world/view is that "vertical" 3-D (world) lines project to vertical 2-D (image) lines when viewers are "erect" in the world (i.e., when the vertical medial plane through the eye is vertical in the world for the current viewing direction). Thus, assuming a world/view context in which viewers are usually erect, vertical image lines (l vertical ) are "non-accidental" features that support the inference l vertical → L vertical .
This regularity, together with a preference for 90° angles (Section 3.1), produces a mode for perceiving an angle as comprising vertical and horizontal lines (in the 3-D world) when one line of the angle is oriented vertically (in the 2-D image). Assuming a strength of order ρ for the "nonaccidental" mode L vertical (see Section 3.2) , and assuming a strength of order ρε for the mode Α=90° (see Section 3.1), the relative strength of the combined mode is estimated as follows:
Note that this mode (of order ρ 2 ε) is stronger than the equal angles/lengths mode (of order ρε 2 , see Section 3.4). Section 4 (below) supports this prediction with an example where a change in image orientation (i.e., from non-vertical to vertical) causes a change in perceptual mode (i.e., from the "weaker" equal angles/lengths mode to the "stronger" vertical/horizontal orientation mode).
Rock's Box
The above analysis predicts specific perceptual modes (and relative strengths) based on specific feature/property representations (Section 2) and associated world/view contexts (Section 3). This Section uses the predicted modes to explain a well-known example ( Figure 9 ) adapted from Rock 1983 (also see Perkins 1976 and Draper 1980) . This example is challenging to predict because the dominant perceptual mode changes with image orientation.
The following observations (from Figure 9 ) need to be explained: , and all four of these angles are perceived as non-90° in Figure 9 (d). 3. In Figures 9(a) and 9(b) , perception of the 3-D angles Α, Β, Γ, ∆ changes with a small change in image orientation. In Figure 9 (a), angles Α and ∆ are perceived as 90° while Β and Γ are perceived as non-90°. In Figure 9 (b), Β and Γ are perceived as 90° while Α and ∆ are perceived as non-90°. 4. In Figures 9(c) , Α and ∆ are perceived as 90° while Β and Γ are perceived as non-90°. 5. In Figure 9 (d), all four of the angles Α, Β, Γ, ∆ are perceived as non-90°. Angles Α and Β are perceived as roughly equal (but non-90°), and angles Γ and ∆ are perceived as roughly equal (but non-90°). The following explanations (of Figure 9 ) are provided here:
, perception of a 3-D object with connected planes/edges (or wire frame) is explained by the mode "coincident/coterminal/parallel". 2. For Figures 9(a)-(d) , two (or more) angles in the set Α, Β, Γ, ∆ are perceived as "non-90°
angles" because two of their associated lines are non-parallel. The specific angles perceived to be non-90° are determined by the modes "vertical/horizontal orientation" and "equal angles/lengths", as discussed below. 3. For Figures 9(a) and 9(b) , the mode "vertical/horizontal orientation" predicts that perception of vertical/horizontal surfaces (i.e., 90° angles) will depend on which angles have verticallyoriented lines. In Figure 9 (a), Α and ∆ are perceived as 90° because α and δ have verticallyoriented lines. In Figure 9 (b), Β and Γ are perceived as 90° because β and γ have verticallyoriented lines (11) . 4. For Figure 9 (c), the angles Α, Β, Γ, ∆ all have vertically oriented lines, so the mode "vertical/horizontal orientation" alone does not predict which angles will be perceived as 90°. However, as noted by Rock (1983) , viewers have a preference (which we would characterize here as a prior mode) for perceiving objects as attached to stable (ground) surfaces. This preference (mode), in conjunction with the mode for vertical/horizontal orientation, explains why the bottom angles Α and ∆ are perceived as 90° while the top angles Β and Γ are perceived as non-90°. 5. For Figure 9 (d), none of the angles Α, Β, Γ, ∆ have vertically-oriented lines. Thus, the mode "vertical/horizontal orientation" does not predict a preference for perceiving any of these angles as 90°. In this case, the weaker mode "equal angles/lengths" is predicted to occur. This explains why viewers perceive roughly equal acute angles (Γ and ∆) and roughly equal obtuse angles (Α and Β). 
Conclusion
We proposed that perception is a process of constructing internal representations (i.e., mental models) of the world. We then postulated specific (probabilistic) representations in a limited domain (of line drawings) and analyzed associated (world/view) regularities that set the context for these representations. Our result is a (partial) catalog of "modes" and "constraints" that explain how viewers can make "reliable" inferences of 3-D properties from 2-D features.
Since multiple modes (and constraints) may be activated by a given image, a viewer's percept depends on complex interactions governed by modal strengths (and constraints). We estimated these strengths (in order-of-magnitude terms), predicted the interactions (in a Bayesian framework) and tested our theory by comparing the predicted modes to observed modes of human perception.
We believe that our Bayesian analysis of mental models provides new insight into Gestalt "preferences" (e.g., good form) and "non-accidentals" (e.g., similarity, proximity and continuity) in visual perception. In pursuing this approach, we seek to understand how the structure of internal representations (i.e., mental models) is influenced by the context of external regularities (i.e., natural modes).
